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We introduce a new quantum protocol for solving detectable Byzantine agreement (also called de-
tectable broadcast) between three parties, and also for solving the detectable liar detection problem.
The protocol is suggested by the properties of a four-qubit entangled state, and the classical part
of the protocol is simpler than that of previous proposals. In addition, we present an experimental
implementation of the protocol using four-photon entanglement.
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A basic goal in distributed computing is to achieve
coordination despite the failure of some of the distributed
processes. This requires the nonfaulty components to
reach an agreement. The problem of coping with such
tasks is expressed abstractly as the Byzantine Generals
Problem, also called Byzantine Agreement (BA) [1, 2].
Three divisions of the Byzantine army, each com-
manded by its own general, are besieging an enemy city.
The three generals A, B, and C can communicate with
one another by messengers only (i.e., by pairwise authen-
ticated error-free classical channels). They must decide
upon a common plan of action either 0 or 1 (for instance,
attack or retreat). The commanding general A decides
on a plan and communicates this plan to the other two
generals by sending B a message mAB (either 0 or 1),
and by sending C a message mAC . Then, B communi-
cates the plan to C by sending him a message mBC , and
C communicates the plan to B by sending him a message
mCB. However, one of the generals (including A) might
be a traitor, trying to keep the loyal generals from agree-
ing on a plan. The BA problem is to devise a protocol
in which (i) all loyal generals follow the same plan, and
(ii) if A is loyal, then every loyal general follows the plan
decided by A. From the point of view of a loyal C receiv-
ing different messages from A and B, the BA problem is
equivalent to the liar detection problem [3], in which C’s
task is to ascertain who is lying, A or B.
The BA problem has been proven to be unsolvable
[1, 2], unless each of the generals is in possession of a list
of numbers unknown to the other generals, but suitably
correlated with the lists of the other generals. There-
fore, solving the BA problem can be reduced to solving
the problem of the generation and secure distribution of
these lists. A quantum protocol enables one to test the
security of the distribution, however, in case of an attack,
no secret lists are available and the whole communication
has to be aborted. Still, in this case, a variation of the
BA, called detectable Byzantine agreement (DBA) or de-
tectable broadcast [4] can be solved [4]. In the DBA prob-
lem, conditions (i) and (ii) are relaxed so that (i’) either
all loyal generals perform the same action or all abort,
and (ii’) if A is loyal, then either every loyal general obeys
the order sent by A or aborts. Consequently, we can de-
fine a protocol for solving the detectable liar detection
problem as that one in which the possible outcomes for
a loyal C receiving different messages from A and B are
either to detect who is lying or to abort [3, 5, 6].
The properties of two specific entangled states have
suggested two different methods for solving the DBA
problem. The first method was inspired by the prop-
erties of the three-qutrit singlet state, and it is based on
lists of six combinations of numbers [4]. Such lists can
also be distributed using two quantum key distribution
protocols [7]. The second method was suggested by the
properties of a four-qubit entangled state, and it is based
on lists of four combinations of numbers [6].
In this Letter we introduce a new protocol for solving
the DBA problem. It uses simpler lists than those in
[4, 7], and uses them more efficiently than in [6]. In
contrast to [7], it allows the simultaneous generation of
all lists. In addition, we present the first experimental
demonstration of a quantum protocol for DBA and liar
detection via four-photon entanglement.
The protocol has two parts. The goal of the first part
is to generate and distribute three lists, lA for A, lB for
B, and lC for C utilizing the characteristic properties
of a particular four-photon polarization entangled state
[8, 9, 10], and to check for the security of this distribution.
Once the parties have these lists, in the second part of the
protocol they use them, together with pairwise classical
communication, for reaching the agreement (Fig. 1). The
option to abort will be used only in the distribution part.
Thereafter, the protocol enables full BA.
In detail, the lists lA, lB, and lC have the following
properties [6]: (I) The three lists have the same length
L. The elements of lA are random trits (i.e., 0, 1, or 2).
The elements of lB and lC are random bits (i.e., 0 or 1).
(II) At position j in these lists, we find the combinations
2FIG. 1: Quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agree-
ment. Three generals, A (the commanding general), B, and
C, are connected by pairwise authenticated error-free classi-
cal channels. In the first part of the protocol, four qubits
prepared in the state |Ψ(4)〉 are distributed among the par-
ties and, after a classical discussion, either (a) each general
obtains a list li, or (b) all loyal generals agree to abort. If
(a) then, in the second part of the protocol, A sends B (C) a
message mAB (mAC) and a list lAB (lAC), and B (C) sends
C (B) a message mBC (mCB) and a list lBC (lCB).
000 (i.e., lAj = 0, lBj = 0, lCj = 0), 111, or, with equal
probability, either 201 or 210. (III) Each party cannot
know other parties’ lists beyond what can be inferred
from his own list and properties (I) and (II).
The result of this first part can be that (a) all parties
agree that they have the right lists and can start the
second part of the protocol or (b) agree to abort it.
To simplify the discussion of the second part of the
protocol, note that the roles of B and C are symmetri-
cal, and thus everything we say about B applies to C
and vice versa. The agreement part runs as follows: (i)
When A sends mAB, this message must be accompanied
by other data which must be correlated with the message
itself and, at the same time, must be known only by A.
For that purpose, A also sends B a list lAB with all the
positions in lA in which the value mAB appears. After
that, if A is loyal he will follow his own plan.
Example: if A is loyal, the message is mAB = mAC =
0, and A’s list is lA = {2, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 2, . . .}, then A
must also send lAB = lAC = {2,3,7,8, . . .}.
When B receives mAB and lAB, only one of two things
can happen: (ia) If lAB is of the appropriate length [i.e.,
approximately L/3, according to property (I)], andmAB,
lAB, and lB do satisfy (II), then we will say that the
data (i.e., mAB, lAB, and lB) are consistent. If the data
are consistent, then B will follow the plan mAB unless
C convinces him that A is the traitor in the next step
of the protocol [see (ii)]. (ib) If mAB, lAB, and lB are
inconsistent, then B ascertains that A is the traitor, and
B will not follow any plan until he reaches an agreement
with C in the next step of the protocol [see (ii)].
Example: B would receive inconsistent data if he
receives the message mAB = 0 accompanied by the
list lAB = {2,5,6,7, . . .}, and B’s list is lB =
{1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, . . .}. This data is inconsistent be-
cause lA cannot have 0 at positions 5 and 6.
(ii) The message mBC can be not only 0 or 1, but
also ⊥, meaning “I have received inconsistent data.” If
the message is 0 or 1, it must be accompanied by other
data which prove that mBC is the same one that B has
received from A; i.e., data that B could only have ob-
tained from A if mBC = mAB. For that purpose, B also
sends C a list lBC which is supposedly the same list lAB
that B has received from A.
When C receives mBC and lBC , he already has mAC
and lAC . Then, only one of six things can happen: (iia)
If mAC , lAC , and lC are consistent, and mBC , lBC , and
lC are also consistent, and mAC = mBC , then C will
follow the plan mAC = mBC . (iib) If mAC , lAC , and lC
are consistent, and mBC , lBC , and lC are also consistent,
but C is receiving conflicting messages (0 or 1) from A
and B, then C ascertains that A is the traitor and B is
loyal, since A is the only one who can send consistent
data to B and C. Since the roles of B and C are sym-
metrical, B also ascertains that A is the traitor and C
is loyal. Then C and B will follow a previously decided
plan, for instance, 0. (iic) IfmAC , lAC , and lC are consis-
tent, and C is receiving mBC = ⊥, then C will follow the
plan mAC . Note that in this case there is no way for B
to convince C that he has actually received inconsistent
information from A. Therefore, following the plan mAC
(even if A is the traitor) is the only option for reaching
agreement with the other loyal party. (iid) If mAC , lAC ,
and lC are consistent, but mBC , lBC , and lC are incon-
sistent, then C ascertains that B is the traitor and A is
loyal. Then C will follow the plan mAC . (iie) If mAC ,
lAC , and lC are inconsistent, but mBC , lBC , and lC are
consistent, then A is the traitor. Then, complementary
to case (iic), they will now follow the plan mBC . (iif)
If mAC , lAC , and lC are inconsistent, and C is receiving
mBC = ⊥, this means that both C and B know that A
is the traitor. Then C and B will follow the previously
decided plan 0.
The generation and distribution of the lists with prop-
erties (I), (II), and (III) is achieved by distributing among
the parties four qubits initially prepared in some spe-
cific state, then making local single qubit measurements
on the four qubits, and then testing (using the pairwise
classical channels) whether or not the results of these
measurements exhibit the required correlations.
The state used in our protocol is the four-qubit state
|Ψ(4)〉abcd = 1
2
√
3
(2|0011〉 − |0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉
−|1010〉+ 2|1100〉)abcd, (1)
where, e.g., |0011〉abcd means |0〉a ⊗ |0〉b ⊗ |1〉c ⊗ |1〉d.
This state has been observed in recent experiments
3[10, 11]. The protocol exploits two properties of this
state, i.e., the fact that it is invariant under the same
unitary transformation applied to the four qubits (i.e.,
U ⊗ U ⊗ U ⊗ U |Ψ(4)〉abcd = |Ψ(4)〉abcd), where U is any
unitary operation acting on one qubit, and the fact that
it exhibits the required perfect correlations between the
results of projection measurements on the four qubits.
Specifically, if Ameasures qubits (a) and (b), B measures
qubit (c) and C measures qubit (d), and all of them are
measuring in the same basis, then: if the results of the
measurements on qubits (a) and (b) are both 1 (which A
will record as a single 0) —something which occurs with
probability 1/3—, then the result of the measurement on
qubit (c) must be 0 (which B will record as 0) and the
result of the measurement on qubit (d) must be 0 (which
C will record as 0). If the results of the measurements
on qubits (a) and (b) are both 0 (which A will record as
a single 1), then the result of the measurement on qubit
(c) must be 1 (which B will record as 1) and the result
of the measurement on qubit (d) must be 1 (which C
will record as 1). Finally, if the results of the measure-
ments on qubits (a) and (b) are either 0 and 1, or 1 and
0 (which A will record as a single 2), then the results of
the measurements on qubits (c) and (d) can be either 0
and 1, or 1 and 0.
The distribute and test part of the protocol consists of
the following steps: (i) A source emits a large number
of four-qubit systems in the state |Ψ(4)〉. For each four-
qubit system j, qubits (a) and (b) are sent to A, qubit (c)
to B and qubit (d) to C. (ii) For each four-qubit system
j, each of the three parties randomly chooses between
two projection measurements; e.g., each of them either
measures in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or in the {|0¯〉, |1¯〉} basis
[where |0¯〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and |1¯〉 = (|0〉− |1〉)/√2] and
makes a list with his results. To extract the correlated
fourfold coincidences, they do the following. For the first
one third of the experiments, C asks A and B whenever
they have detected and in which bases they have mea-
sured their qubits (50% of the cases, A speaks first, and
in the other 50%, it is B who speaks first). Then, C tells
A and B which events should be rejected. For the sec-
ond one third of the experiments, B and C exchange their
roles, and for the last one third, A and B exchange their
roles. By exchanging the roles, they ensure that none of
the generals can fake parts of the classical protocol with-
out being discovered. After this step, each of the parties
has a list. These lists are all of the same length. A has
a list lA of trits, and each of B and C has a list, lB and
lC respectively, of bits. (iii) C randomly chooses a posi-
tion kC from his list lC and asks A and B to inform him,
via the pairwise classical channels, about their results on
the same position kC . If all parties have measured in the
same basis, their results must be suitably correlated. Af-
ter this step, each party discards the entries in their lists
which were used for this test. (iv) The parties exchange
their roles; i.e., B randomly chooses a new position kB
FIG. 2: Scheme of the experimental setup. UV-pulses pump
a beta-barium borate crystal BBO. The degenerate down-
conversion emission into the two directions, a0 and b0, is cou-
pled into optical fibers by fiber couplers FC, then passes in-
terference filters F . To generate the state |Ψ(4)〉, the initial
emission modes are split with two nonpolarizing beam split-
ters BS. Two of the photons are sent to A, one to B, and one
to C. Then, each party performs polarization measurements
by inserting a half-wave plate HWP and using a polarizing
beam splitter PBS and single-photon avalanche detectors.
from his list and repeats step (iii); then A chooses a new
position kA, etc. C starts the process all over again until
a large number of tests have been performed.
This part of the protocol has only two possible out-
comes: Depending on the observed quantum error ratio
(QER), defined as the ratio of incorrect/all four-photon
detection events, the loyal generals decide to abort or use
the lists lA, lB, and lC to reach the agreement.
In the experimental implementation, the physical
qubits are polarized photons, and the states |0〉 and |1〉,
correspond, respectively, to the vertical and horizontal
linear polarization states, |V 〉 and |H〉. To prepare the
state |Ψ(4)〉, we have used the emission of four photons
produced in the second order of perturbation of the type-
II process of spontaneous parametric down-conversion
[8, 9, 10]. The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2. We
have used UV-pulses of a frequency doubled mode-locked
Titan:Sapphire laser (pulse length 130 fs and repetition
rate 82 MHz) to pump a 2 mm thick beta-barium bo-
rate (BBO) crystal at a wavelength of 390 nm and with
an average power of 750 mW. The pump beam has been
focused to a waist of 100 µm inside the crystal. The
degenerate down-conversion emission into the two char-
acteristic type-II crossing directions, a0 and b0, has been
coupled into single mode optical fibers (length 2 m) to
precisely define the spatial emission modes. After the
fibers, the down-conversion light has passed interference
4filters with a bandwidth of 3 nm. To generate the four-
photon state |Ψ(4)〉, the initial emission modes have been
split with two nonpolarizing beam splitters. We have se-
lected those events in which one photon is detected in
each of the resulting four outputs (a, b, c, and d) of the
beam splitters.
The polarization measurements have been performed
by inserting half-wave plates in each of the four modes.
For measuring in the polarization bases {|H〉, |V 〉} and
{(|H〉+|V 〉)/√2, (|H〉−|V 〉)/√2}, the orientations of the
half-wave plates have been randomly switched between 0◦
and 22.5◦ respectively. The switching of the wave plates
has been controlled by random number generators. The
registration time for a fixed setting has been 1 s. The
four photons have been detected, after passing polariz-
ing beam splitters, by eight passively quenched single-
photon Si-avalanche photodiodes and registered with an
eight-channel multiphoton coincidence counter, which al-
lows an efficient registration of the 16 relevant fourfold
coincidences [12]. When more than one four-photon coin-
cidence has been recorded in the same time window, only
the first one has been used. To translate the detection
events into bit values, we have associated a single-photon
detection in the reflected (transmitted) output port of
the polarization beam splitters with the bit value 0 (1).
All the detection events and the basis settings have been
registered with a personal computer.
To generate the lists, the parties have performed 48184
measurements in 17 hours. To extract the fourfold coin-
cidences in each time window, each party has asked the
other parties whenever they detected a photon. After
removing those entries where they have not registered a
photon, they have obtained lists lA, lB and lC with 12043
entries containing 3000 correlated bits/trits with a QER
of 5.47%. For the first part of the protocol, each of the
parties has randomly chosen 1000 entries from his list.
To check whether their results are perfectly correlated or
not, each party has computed the QER for those entries
which should be perfectly correlated from his subset. A
has obtained a QER of 3.32%, B 4.64%, and C 5.40%
(the QERs depend on the randomly chosen subsets). For
the second part of the protocol, the parties have used
the remaining correlated entries of their lists. A subset
of these lists is shown in Table I.
In conclusion, we have introduced a new quantum pro-
tocol for solving a fundamental problem in fault-tolerant
distributed computation and database replication. Our
protocol uses simpler lists or uses them more efficiently
than previous protocols, and permits the simultaneous
generation of all the lists. In addition, we have presented
the first experimental demonstration of a quantum pro-
tocol for DBA and liar detection via four-qubit entangle-
ment. Although the same problems could be solved by
linking several quantum key distribution protocols, our
results show that a more specific and elegant quantum
solution requiring a subtler form of entanglement is fea-
TABLE I: Part of the lists lA, lB , and lC obtained experimen-
tally. Numbers in italics are events which should not occur in
an ideal case.
Position lA lB lC Position lA lB lC
1 2 1 0 16 1 1 1
2 0 0 0 17 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 18 1 1 1
4 2 0 1 19 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 20 0 0 0
6 1 1 1 21 2 1 0
7 0 0 0 22 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 23 2 0 1
9 2 0 1 24 0 0 0
10 2 0 1 25 2 1 0
11 2 1 0 26 1 1 1
12 2 0 1 27 1 1 0
13 0 0 0 28 1 1 0
14 2 1 1 29 2 1 1
15 2 0 1 30 2 0 1
sible with present technology.
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